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Abstract
Since the 1980s, many European countries have implemented labor market reforms, introducing
more exible labor contracts. This paper develops a matching model with heterogeneous matches
in order to analyse the impact of employment protection on labor productivity. Several channels
a¤ects productivity. On one hand, exible contracts reduce mismatching: low productive jobs
are destroyed at no cost with a positive impact on the overall productivity. On the other hand,
they imply lower human capital investment, reducing labor productivity. We analyze a third
channel: the selection of the employees. Low costs of dismissal reduce the incentive of rms to
invest in screening applicants, therefore increasing the uncertainty about their unobserved skills
and productivity.
Keywords: Employment protection, Stochastic.job matching model, Screening.
1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, many European countries have implemented labor market reforms aimed at reducing
the level of employment protection. The idea behind this process is twofold: on one hand, labor market
rigidities are regarded as a cause of the poor dynamic of employment in Europe as opposed to US.
Furthermore, it is claimed that rigidities hinder the adjustment of workforce to shocks and, therefore,
are a burden on the competitiveness of the European economy.
Theres a wide literature on the e¤ects of employment protection legislation (EPL). It focuses
mainly on the e¤ects on unemployment and job turnover. The main ndings are that EPL reduces
both hiring and ring of workers with ambiguous e¤ect on unemployment.1 Little e¤ort has been
devoted to the analysis of the impact of EPL on productivity. Few exceptions are Alonso-Borrego et
al. (2004), Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2004) and Veracierto (2003) that calibrate and simulate
general equilibrium models to assess the impact of labor market reforms on output and productivity.
They generally nd some positive e¤ect of the introduction of temporary contracts. Their models focus
on the role of EPL in increasing mismatching, that is the tendency of rms to retain unproductive
workers instead of dismissing them and paying ring costs (institutional labor hoarding).
Other factors a¤ect productivity: ring costs can stimulate investment in human capital,2 or may
lead rms to implement stricter selection rules. We consider the latter channel: the employers re-
cruitment choice. Low costs of dismissal reduce the incentive of rms to invest in screening applicants,
1Among the most cited studies, see Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Ljungqvist (2002). An overview is provided in
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, chapter 12).
2See Arulampalam and Booth (1998), and Rix et al. (1999) for empirical evidence.
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therefore increasing the uncertainty about their unobserved skills and productivity. Literature on
employerssearch provides evidence of the correlation between recruitment and workers quality.3 Fur-
thermore, a study by Abowd et al (2002): reveals that productivity is positively related to soft skills,
i.e. unobservable characteristics of employees. In light of this ndings, the selection process turns out
to be an important factor in the formation of rms outcome.
This paper develops a matching model with heterogeneus mathes and endogenous job destruction
capable to account for both mismatching and employee selection. On one side, EPL is associated with
lower job destruction and more mismatching. On the other side, ring costs increase the average quality
of workforce, inducing higher hiring standards. The net e¤ect depends on the relative importance of
job-specic and match-specic components of productivity.
Next Section reviews the previous literature on the relation between recruitment choice and pro-
ductivity. Section 3 presens the model. Findings are discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Employment selection and productivity
The selection process consists in the set of activities through which the employer collects informations
about potential employees. The choice of the recruitment method a¤ects the quality of applicants,4
thereby the productivity of jobs. This relation is stricter the greater is the dependence of productivity
on personal characteristics of workers.
Abowd et al. (2002) evaluate the contribution of human capital to business productivity and
shareholder value. They nd a substantial positive relation between human capital and market value
that is primarily related to the unmeasured personal characteristics of the employees, called "soft
skills".5 In the same spirit, Haskel, Hawkes and Pereira (2003) distinguish between hard skills - i.e.
education, experience and, in general, formal observable skills - and soft skills - informal skills such as
attitude, time keeping, etc. Exploiting UK data, they nd positive correlation between both types of
skill and productivity, measured as gross output per employee.
Nevertheless, empirical evidence relating personnel department expenditures to organizational out-
comes is inconclusive. Abowd, Milkovich and Hannon (1990) nd no signicant correlation between
human resource decisions and shareholder value. Eastwood, Rudin and Lee (1995) analyze the rela-
tion between previous years personnel departement expenditures and total annual output, for eleven
large railroads in US over six years. The rough correlation is positive, but after controlling for total
assets and workforce size, no e¤ect of personnel department expenditure is found. On the other side,
Boundreau (1991) reviewed 19 empirical studies of improved selection techniques and concludes that
<<virtually every study has produced dollar-valued payo¤s that clearly exceeded costs>>.
Also Phillips (1988) nds positive signicant correlation between HR expenditures and organiza-
tional outcomes.
In the following, we introduce the selection process in a matching model and study the inuence
of employment protection legislation on the selection choice and on productivity.
3See Devaro (2003, 2005).
4See Devaro (2003, 2005) for a discussion.
5Abowd et al. (2002) construct a measure of human capital using employer-employee data. Their measure includes
not only education and experience, but also the person e¤ect, which can capture unobservable component of skills.
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3 The model
In this section we present a stochastic job matching model with endogenous job destruction. Our
theoretical framework is an extension of the matching model developed by Pries (2004) and Pries and
Rogerson (2005).
3.1 Description of the model
Labor market is characterized by frictions, in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and
by incomplete information, as in Jovanovic (1979). Firms with posted vacancies, v, and unemployed
households,6 u, meet in the labor market at a frequency determined by the function m (v; u).7 The
probabilities that a rm meets a worker and that a worker meets a rm are, respectively, q and p:
qt () =
m (vt; ut)
vt
(1)
pt () =
m (vt; ut)
ut
(2)
where  is the ratio between vacancies v and unemployment u, and it is called market tightness.
But not all contacts lead to job matches. Production is characterized by stochasticity: jobs and
workers have many unobservable characteristics that can inuence the productivity of the job match.
The outcome from a lled position is  + y, per unit of time, where  is a job-specic component
and y is match specic. We assume that  is observable and known by both parties, and is subject
to productivity shocks that follow a Poisson process with arrival rate . When the match is initially
formed, the technology component is equal to , but after a shock occurs, a new value for  is drawn
from a distribution G () over the interval

; 

. The match specic component is unobservable. Firms
and workers learn about the true quality of the match through the selection process, before forming
the match, and on-the-job, through monitoring. Following Pries (2004), we assume that
y = y + " (3)
where y is the true match quality and " is a zero-mean random variable. There are two types
of matches: good, y = yg, and bad, y = yb < yg. The noise term prevents workers and rms from
perfectly inferring match quality immediately after observing the rst production.
When a worker and a rm meet, each receives the same signal  that correspond to the probability
that the match will be good, yg, if it is formed. The realization  is a drawing from a known probability
distribution H (). Low realization of  may be rejected because of the prospect of a better job match
in the future. There will be a minimum value, , such that it is optimal to form a match only if the
signal is higher than the reservation probability . Once the match is formed and production is carried
on, both rm and worker observe the output  + y, which is an imperfect signal of the true quality
of the match. We assume that the noise " is uniformly distributed on [ !; !]. Therefore, whenever y
is lower than yg   !, or higher than yb + !, the quality of the match is revealed to be bad or good,
6We do not allow for on the job search.
7 It is standard to assume that m (; ) is of constant return to scale with positive rst-order and negative second-order
partial derivatives. See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000) for a detailed discussion and empirical evidence.
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respectively.8 Call  = y
g yb
2! the probability that a match type is revealed. Jobs are destroyed either
because the match is revealed to be bad, with probability  (1  ), or because they are hit by a
negative productivity shock.
Following Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004), we assume that wages are composed by a xed component,
w, plus a constant fraction, ', of output:
w (; y) = ' ( + y) + (1  ') w (4)
This assumption simplies the solution of the model and allows to abstract from workers behavior:
they are always willing to form and to continue a match as long as the wage is higher than their outside
option, b. A su¢ cient condition is (1  ') w  b. However, the wage equation in 4 is not far from wage
derived from the solution of a Nash bargaining problem, as proposed in standard matching models.9
Lets call J (; ) the value to the rm of being in a match associated with a signal  and technology
, and V the value to the rm of an unlled vacancy. They are dened by the ow of expected prots
yield, respectively, by a lled or an ulled employment position.
J (; ) =  + yg + (1  ) yb   w (; ) + 
Z 
R
J (s; ) dG (s) +G (R) (V   F )

+ (1  ) [J (; 1) +  (1  ) (V   F ) + (1  ) J (; )] (5)
V =  k + 

q ()
Z 1

J (; ) dH () + q ()H ()V + (1  q ())V

(6)
were  is the discount factor, F is the ring cost, and k is the cost of posting a vacancy. We assume
that yb is low enough so that bad matches are always destroyed and workers dismissed paying F . We
also assume that there is no learning about workers quality when there is a shock. Note that the value
of a job, equation 5, is increasing in  and , and decreasing in F .
3.2 Equilibrium
Lets call eg the mass of matches known to be of good quality, and en the mass of matches of unknown
quality.
Denition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is a list w (; ) ; ; eg, en, J (; ) ; V such that:
- value functions 5 and 6 are satised,
- workers are paid according to the wage equation 4,
8Note that we are assuming yb + ! > yg   !, otherwise, there would not be any uncertainty about the quality of the
match after observing y.
9The standard wage equation is
w = (1  ) b+ p+ k
where 0    1 is the bargaining power of workers, b is return from unemployment, p = +y is job outcome,  is market
tightness (i.e. number of vacancies over the number of unemployed workers) and k is the cost of posting vacancies. Note
that the wage has a xed component (1  ) b and a variable component which is increasing in productivity p and in
market tightness . Our wage equation 4 as well has a xed component (1  ') w, and a variable component increasing
in productivity, but it does not depend on market tightness.
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- market tightness  satises the free entry condition: V = 0,
- matches are formed only if   ,
- matches are destroyed if bad and if the productivity shock is such that  < R
- the rate of unemployment, eg and en are constant.
Knowing the value functions 5 and 6, the rm decides whether to post a vacancy, whether to form
a match and, once the match is formed, under which condition continue or dismiss the worker. Firms
post vacancies as long as their value is positive. Free entry ensures that, in equilibrium, the value of
a vacant position is zero:
V = 0 (7)
therefore:
k = q ()
Z 1

J (; ) dH () (8)
Equation 8 gives the equilibrium market tightness .
Then applicants arrive to the rm, but they are hired only if the probability to form a good match,
, is su¢ ciently high. A match is formed only if its value is positive:
J (; ) = 0 (9)
Condition 9 implies that the hiring threshold  must satisfy the following:
(1  ')  + yg + (1  ) yb   w+  (1  )J (1) (  R1)
+J ()
Z 
R
(s R) dG (s)   [(1  )+ ]F = 0 (10)
where J (x) is the derivative of J (; x) with respect to , computed at value  = x,10 and Rx is
the job destruction threshold at  = x. Note that higher ring costs F are associated with higher
threshold . This result is found also in Pries and Rogerson (2005).
As anticipated above, a job is destroyed if the match is revealed to be bad quality, with probability
 (1  ), or if a productivity shock reduces its value below the rms outside option. Given ring
costs, the outside option of a rm is  F and the job destruction condition turns out:
J (R; ) =  F (11)
The threshold R depends on the match specic component :
(1  ') R + yg + (1  ) yb   w+ (1  )F
+ (1  )J (1) (R  R1) + J ()
Z 
R
(s R) dG (s) = 0 (12)
higher signal  means higher expected productivity, therefore the value of the match is larger and it
is destroyed only if the productivity shock is particularly low. Also, R is decreasing in F : ring costs
protect workers by reducing job destruction.
10The derivative of J (; ) with respect to  is increasing in .
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Lets consider workersows. Every period, rms with vacancies and unemployed workers meet in
the labor market according to the function m (v; u) = q ()u. Depending on the signal , only some
of these meeting lead to a match, so that job creation comes to q () [1 H ()]u. Job destruction
depends on the match specic component : matches are separated if they are detected to be bad, with
probability (1  ) (1  ), and when they are hit by a negative productivity shock, at rate G (R).
On average, job destruction occurs at rate (1  ) (1  ~) + jd (R), where ~ is the probability that
the match is good over the pool of existing matches of unknown quality and jd (R) e = JD (R) is the
mass of jobs destroyed by productivity shocks..Lets call e the pool of matches with signal . Then,
JD (R) is equal to the sum of G (R) e over  2 [; 1]:
JD (R) =
Z 1

G (R) edH ()
The equilibrium between job inows and outows dene the steady state unemployment:
q () [1 H ()]u = (1  ) (1  ~) en +
Z 1

G (R) edH () (13)
u =
jd (R) + (1  ) (1  ~) en
jd (R) + q () [1 H ()] (14)
where en is the mass of existing matches of unknown quality and e = 1  u.
Employment protection, in terms of ring costs F , has several e¤ects in this model: larger F is
associated to higher hiring standard , lower destruction threshold R for any given , and less job
creation, i.e. smaller . The net e¤ect on unemployment is ambiguous. Also the e¤ect on the average
labor productivity is ambiguous, as explained in the following.
3.3 Labor productivity
In this framework, labor productivity is determined by a technology component , and therefore on
technological shocks, and a match specic component y, which depends on the selection process of new
employees and on the detection of bad matches. In order to assess the average productivity, we need
to distinguish di¤erent groups of matches.
In steady state, there will be a mass of matches of unknown quality, en, whose productivy is:
ALPn = ~n + ~y
g + (1  ~) yb (15)
where ~n is the average technology-specic component of en. Note that ~n is not equal to
R 1 

hR 
R
dG ()
i
dH (), where  is positive and small, because among the unknow quality matches there is a number
of newly hired employees with  = . Therefore, the distribution of the technology component within
en has a mass point at .
In steady state, outows must be equal to inows. We use this property to derive the steady state
value for en:
[jdn (R) + (1  )] en = q () [1 H ()]u (16)
en =
q () [1 H ()]u
jdn (R) + (1  ) (17)
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Equation 16 states the equality of inows and outows. A match exit the pool of unknow quality
matches when it is hit by a bad shock and destroyed, JDn (R) = jdn (R) en, and when it is detected,
either good or bad, (1  )en. Note that JDn (R) =
R 1 

G (R) edH () Entries into en are given
by job creation ow, q () [1 H ()]u.
Lets consider good quality matches, eg. Their productivity is:
ALPg = ~g + y
g (18)
where ~g =
R 
R1
dG (). The mass of good workers is given by the following condition:
G (R1) eg = (1  )~en (19)
eg =
(1  )~en
G (R1)
(20)
Good type matches are destroyed only when hit by a negative productivity shock, G (R1) eg, and they
are generated by the detection of good matches among the pool of unknown quality ones, (1  )~en.
In the end, the average labor productivity is a weighted mean of ALPn and ALPg:
ALP =
ALPnen +ALPgeg
en + eg
=
~n + ~y
g + (1  ~) yb +  ~g + yg  [(1  )~] = [G (R1)]
1 + [(1  )~] = [G (R1)] (21)
Lowering employment protection has an ambiguous e¤ect on ALP . On one side, smaller ring costs
F are associated to larger job destruction after technology shocks: the threshold R increases and the
technology specic component of productivity is raised, both for unknown quality matches, ~n, and
good matches,~g. On the other side, rms become less selective at the entry: the hiring standard 
decreases and a higher share of potentially bad matches are formed, with negative e¤ect on the match
specic component of productivity.
4 Discussion
The model predicts that selection of employees is more accurate the higher is employment protection
(EPL). This is consistent with the empirical evidence provided in Chapter 2. The net e¤ect on
productivity is ambiguous: on one side, small ring costs are associated with low average quality of
matches, on the other side there is larger adjustment to exogenous shocks and the average job specic
productivity turns higher. Which e¤ect dominates depends on the characteristics of the economy: a
dynamic enviroment, characterized by high volatility, is likely to benet from the lessening of labor
market regulation, as long as the outcome is mainly related to job-specic factors. When the match-
specic component is prevailing, the relaxation of EPL may damper labor productivity.
A similar argument is stressed in Felstead and Gallie (2004). They distinguish between numerical
exibility, i.e. the ability of an organization workforce to be quickly and easily increased or decrease,
and functional exibility, which relates with adaptability of the workforce to change and take on new
roles. The former is assured by temporary contracts, the latter is mainly provided by permanent
workers.
Employment protection a¤ects also the investment in human capital. Using a matching model,
Wasmer (2005) shows that EPL enhances the investment in specic skills to the detriment of general
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skills. Lamo, Messina and Wasmer (2007) provide evidence that the large investment in specic human
capital slow down labor reallocation, lenghtening the duration of unprotable jobs. On the other side,
reducing employment protection is not proved to be benecial. Empirical studies by Arulampalam
and Booth (1998), and Rix et al. (1999) reveals that temporary workers are less likely to be involved
in training activities to improve their skills. Marinescu (2006) examines the 1999 British reform that
lowered the tenure necessary for a worker to be protected from unfair dismissal. The calibration of the
model reveals an increase in both recruitment and a small increase in monitoring e¤ort, hence match
quality. Furthermore, she nds that low tenure workers are more likely to receive training after the
reform.
Whether employment protection enhances or depress productivity is an empirical issue. Only
a few studies try to assess the impact of employment protection. Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007)
exploit the adoption of wrongful discharge protection by US state courts to estimate the e¤ect of
dismissal costs on rmsproductivity. Their results show that the introduction of good faith exception
augmented the investment in capital,decreased total factor productivity, computed as the residual
of the production function, and rised substantially labor productivity. This increase reects capital
deepening and compositional shifts in labour quality. Diaz-Mayans and Sanchez (2004) used the
stochastic frontier approach to measure the technical e¢ ciency of Spanish manufacturing rms and
nd a negative relation between the proportion of xed-term contracts and technical e¢ ciency.
A di¤erent approach has been used by macroeconomists. Aguirregabiria an Alonso-Borrego (2004)
calibrate and simulate a dynamic labor demand model on Spain to study the e¤ects of the introduction
of temporary contracts. Their framework allows for endogenous job destruction and human capital
accumulation, i.e. newly hired employee are less productive than tenured ones. The use of temporary
contracts is associated with higher turnover, i.e. lower mismatching, but also to a higher share of low
tenure workers. Simulation shows a small positive e¤ect on output and rmsvalue. Similar results
are found in Alonso-Borrego et al. (2004).
5 Conclusion
The past two decades have been characterized by a series of labor market reforms in several European
countries. In particular, the use of temporary contracts, subject to low or null dismissal costs, has been
extended. The e¤ects of such reforms have been widely analyzed, but only as regard labor outcomes,
such as unemployment level and job ows.
Only a few papers study the relation between employment protection and productivity with contro-
versial results. Studies using micro data provide empirical evidence of a negative e¤ect of lowering EPL
on labor productivity. On the contrary, small positive e¤ects are found in macro analysis simulating
general equilibrium models.
A complete understanding of the inuence of EPL on productivity requires the identication of
all the channels through which EPL operates.The size of ring costs a¤ect rmsproduction choice at
many level: high EPL give rise to institutional labor hoarding, with negative e¤ect on productivity,
but also increase hiring standard, thereby increasing the average quality of matches. We study both
e¤ects in a matching model with heterogeneous matches. The net impact on productivity is ambiguous
and depends on the incidence of exogenous shocks relative to the contribution of the match-specic
component to the overall productivity. Further analysis is needed in order to quantify the impact of
each factor on labor productivity.
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A The model
Lets recall the rms value function:
J (; ) =  + yg + (1  ) yb   w (; ) + 
Z 
R
J (s; ) dG (s) +G (R) (V   F )

+ (1  ) [J (; 1) +  (1  ) (V   F ) + (1  ) J (; )] (22)
V =  k + 

q ()
Z 1

J (; ) dH () + q ()H ()V + (1  q ())V

(23)
Using the free entry condition, V = 0, we can rewrite the job value function as:
J (; ) =  + yg + (1  ) yb   w (; ) + 
Z 
R
J (s; ) dG (s) G (R)F

+ (1  ) [J (; 1)   (1  )F + (1  ) J (; )] (24)
Note that, for any given , J (; ) is a linear function of  with slope:
J () =
@J (; )
@
=
1  '+  (1  )J (1)
1   (1  ) (1  ) (25)
where
J (; 1) = (1  ') [ + yg   w]+ (1  ) [J (; 1) + (1  ) J (; 1)]+
Z 
R
J (s; 1) dG (s) G (R)F

(26)
! J (1) = (1  ')
1   (1  ) (27)
therefore:
J () = (1  ') 1   + +    
[1   + +   ] [1   + ] (28)
The linearity of J (; ) in  allow to solve the integral in equation 24:Z 
R
J (s; ) dG (s) = J ()
Z 
R
(s R) dG (s)  [1 G (R)]F (29)
and we can rewrite the job value function as:
J (; ) =  + yg + (1  ) yb   w (; ) + 

J ()
Z 
R
(s R) dG (s)  F

+ (1  ) [J (; 1)   (1  )F + (1  ) J (; )] (30)
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A.1 Equilibrium conditions
JOB DESTRUCTION:
The job destruction condition is:
J (R; ) =  F (31)
or, equivalently:
[1   (1  ) (1  )] J (R; ) =   [1   (1  ) (1  )]F (32)
Using equation 30 valued at  = R, we get:
  [1   (1  ) (1  )]F = (1  ') R + yg + (1  ) yb   w+  J ()Z 
R
(s R) dG (s)  F

+ (1  ) [J (R; 1)   (1  )F ] (33)
We can further simplify the equation by deriving the value for J (R; 1):
J (R; 1)  J (R1; 1) = (1  ') [R  R1]
1   (1  ) (34)
J (R; 1) =
(1  ') [  R]
1   (1  )   F (35)
we used condition 31 to pass from 34 to 35. Now equation 33 reads:
  [1   (1  ) (1  )]F = (1  ') R + yg + (1  ) yb   w   [+ (1  )]F
+ (1  )J (1) (R  R1) + J ()
Z 
R
(s R) dG (s)(36)
Simplifying F , we get the job destruction equation:
(1  ') R + yg + (1  ) yb   w+ (1  )F
+ (1  )J (1) (R  R1) + J ()
Z 
R
(s R) dG (s) = 0 (37)
Lets compute the derivative of R with respect to F :
@R
@F
=   @JD=@F
@JD=@R
=   1  
1  '  J () [1 G (R)] +  (1  )J (1) < 0 (38)
The derivative is negative because:
J () =
 [1   + +    ] (1  ')
(1   + ) [1   + +   ] < (1  ') (39)
! 1  '  J () [1 G (R)] > 0 (40)
! 1  '  J () [1 G (R)] +  (1  )J (1) > 0 (41)
!   1  
1  '  J () [1 G (R)] +  (1  )J (1) < 0 (42)
12
We can show that R is decreasing in :
@R
@
=   @JD=@
@JD=@R
=   (1  ')
 
yg   yb+  (1  )J (1) (R  R1) + @J()@ R R (s R) dG (s)
1  '  J () [1 G (R)] +  (1  )J (1) < 0
(43)
because @J()@ > 0
MATCH FORMATION:
The match formation condition is:
J (; ) = 0 (44)
or, equivalently:
[1   (1  ) (1  )] J (; ) = 0 (45)
Lets value equation 30 at :
[1   (1  ) (1  )] J (; ) = (1  ')  + yg + (1  ) yb   w+  J ()Z 
R
(s R) dG (s)  F

+ (1  ) [J (; 1)   (1  )F ]
= (1  ')  + yg + (1  ) yb   w+ J ()Z 
R
(s R) dG (s)  F
+ (1  ) f [J (1) (  R1)  F ]   (1  )Fg
= (1  ')  + yg + (1  ) yb   w+ J ()Z 
R
(s R) dG (s)
+ (1  )J (1) (  R1)   [(1  )+ ]F (46)
We combine equation 46 with the job destruction function 37:
(1  ') (  R) +  (1  )J (1) (  R)  F [1   (1  ) (1  )] = 0 (47)
Lets compute the derivative of  with respect to F :
@
@F
=  @MF=@F
@MF=@
(48)
@MF
@
=   (1  ') @R
@
+  (1  )J (1)

(  R)  @R
@

> 0 (49)
because @R@ < 0, as we showed in 43.
@MF
@F
=   (1  ') @R
@F
   (1  )J (1) @R
@F
  [1   (1  ) (1  )]
=
(1  ) [1  '+  (1  )J (1)]
1  '  J () [1 G (R)] +  (1  )J (1)   [1   (1  ) (1  )] (50)
Use equation 25:
J () =
1  '+  (1  )J (1)
1   (1  ) (1  ) (51)
! 1  '+  (1  )J (1) = J () [1   (1  ) (1  )] (52)
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therefore:
1  '  J () [1 G (R)] +  (1  )J (1) = J () [1   (1  + ) + G (R)] (53)
@MF
@F
=
(1  ) J () [1   (1  ) (1  )]
J () [1   (1  + ) + G (R)]   [1   (1  ) (1  )]
=
(1  ) [1   (1  ) (1  )]  [1   (1  ) (1  )] [1   (1  + ) + G (R)]
[1   (1  + ) + G (R)]
=
  [1   (1  ) (1  )] [1  (1  + ) + G (R)]
1   (1  ) (1  )   [1 G (R)] < 0 (54)
and the derivative @@F turns out to be positive: larger ring costs imply higher hiring standards.
JOB CREATION:
Job creation is derived substituting the free entry condition, V = 0, into the value function of
vacancies:
k = q ()
Z 1

J (; ) dH () (55)
We showed that an increase in F implies a decrease in R and a rise in " . To compute the e¤ect
on market tightness  we have rst to derive the relation between F and the job value:
@J (; )
@F
=
1
1   (1  ) (1  )

 (1  )


@J (; 1)
@F
   (1  )

+ 

 J () @R
@F
[1 G (R)]  1

(56)
@J (; 1)
@F
=

1   (1  )

 J (1) @R1
@F
[1 G (R1)]  1

=

1   (1  )

J (1) (1  ) [1 G (R1)]
1  '  J (1) [1 G (R1)] +  (1  )J (1)   1

=   
1   (1  )
(1   (1  ))G (R1) +  (1  )
1   [1   (1  )] + G (R1) < 0 (57)
 J () @R
@F
[1 G (R)]  1
= J ()
1  
J () [1   (1  ) (1  )]  J () [1 G (R)] [1 G (R)]  1
=
  [1   (1  )]G (R)   (1  )
1   [1   (1  )] + G (R) < 0 (58)
! @J (; )
@F
< 0
Using results in 57 and 58, we prooved that the job value is decreasing in F .
Given that F reduces  and J (; ), for equation 55 to hold is necessary that  decreases as F
increases.
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